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Abstract
Dwight D. Eisenhower has been criticized as an anti-intellectual by scholars such as
Richard Hofstadter. Eisenhower’s tenure as president of Columbia University was one segment
of his career he was particularly criticized for because of his non-traditional approach to
education there. This paper examines Eisenhower’s time at Columbia to explain how antiintellectualism played into his university administration. It explains how his personality and
general outlook came to clash with the intellectual environment of Columbia especially in the
wake of the faculty revolt against former Columbia President Nicholas Murray Butler. It argues
that Eisenhower utilized the Columbia institution to promote a Cold War educational agenda,
which often belittled Columbia intellectuals and their scholarly pursuits. However, this paper
also counter-argues that Eisenhower, despite accusations of anti-intellectualism, was an
academically interested man who never engaged in true suppression of free thought despite
pressure from McCarthyite influences in American government, media and business.

Keywords: Dwight D. Eisenhower; Richard Hofstadter; Columbia University; AntiIntellectualism; Anti-Communism; McCarthyism
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Introduction
A scholar at Columbia University once told the new University President Dwight D.
Eisenhower that “we have some of the most exceptional physicists, mathematicians, chemists
and engineers.” In response, Eisenhower asked if they were also “exceptional Americans?”
Confused, the scholar attempted to explain that they were excellent researchers but Eisenhower
abruptly cut him off—“Dammit, what good are exceptional physicists…exceptional anything
unless they are exceptional Americans.”1 This statement reveals one of the General’s personal
and public attitudes he expressed at times throughout his career and was especially notable
during his tenure at Columbia. Eisenhower’s critical and suspicious attitude towards intellectuals
is characteristic of an ideological phenomenon known as anti-intellectualism. Colleen Shogan
views anti-intellectualism, in the broad sense, as some form of fundamental opposition towards
the acquiring of knowledge through the intellectual mediums of reason, contemplation and
critical thought. The anti-intellectual, instead, prefers to acquire understanding through instincts,
intuition, innate sense of character and moral sensibilities.2 Richard Hofstadter defines antiintellectualism as a general “resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and those who are
considered to represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize the value of that life.”3 Thus,
the anti-intellectual phenomenon is often expressed, both individually and institutionally, as
disdain and distrust for intellectuals and intellectual activities and a pragmatic approach to
problem solving. It is reflected through various spectrums of the societal milieu including
politics, education, business, religion and the military.
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When initially offered the presidency of Columbia by University Trustee and IBM CEO
Tom Watson in 1946, Eisenhower replied that he was not the man for the job. He insisted that
Watson and the other Columbia trustees would prefer his brother Milton, who was much more
suitable for the position as a career academic and the current president of Kansas State
University.4 However, Watson and the other trustees wanted the General in particular because it
was believed that his household name could help in fundraising.5 Despite Eisenhower’s initial
disinterest, Watson eventually persuaded him to accept the position on the grounds that he could
fulfill his duty in helping to mold the upcoming generation of American youth through a
leadership role at such a prestigious institution as Columbia. However, Eisenhower dictated
terms that he would have no involvement in purely academic affairs, no excessive social duties
and would not be burdened by tedious administrative details. Instead, Eisenhower intended to
devote his energies to “providing internal leadership on broad and liberal lines and promote basic
concepts of education in a democracy.”6 These terms were deemed acceptable by Watson and the
other trustees and so Eisenhower succeeded long time Columbia President Nicholas Murray
Butler as thirteenth president of Columbia University.7
Eisenhower’s Columbia administration was unconventional in that it was not focused on
the intellectual aspects of the university that comprised a typical Ivy League liberal education.
Instead, Eisenhower attempted to run Columbia more as a military operation with the strategic
goal of preserving and perpetuating the message of Americanism. Right before coming to
Columbia, Eisenhower finished his memoirs, Crusade in Europe, regarding his experience
leading forces in World War II. Columbia would serve as his next crusade for the perpetuation of
4
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American freedom and democracy; a symbolic notion made all the more appropriate considering
Eisenhower assumed his Columbia Presidency exactly four years and a day after the Allied
landing in Normandy.8 Evidence also suggests that by 1948 Eisenhower was actively interested
in the U.S. presidency despite his vocal avowals against any type of nomination. His efforts
cultivating his seemingly apolitical moral sensibilities and “simple man” image attests to the
notion that he strategically utilized his modest origins and status as a war hero to appeal to the
American populist majority in a bid for the U.S. Presidency.9 This purposeful de-intellectualizing
of himself in order to appeal to the common man and set the bar for leadership low so he could
easily exceed it later was at the core of his “hidden-hand” leadership style.10
At the university, he employed a strict chain of command separating him from his faculty
and supported the establishment of pragmatic and patriotic educational programs. He also
promoted measures to prevent the spread of communism both within the university and outside
of it. He saw his Columbia presidency as a part of his preeminent sense of duty to his country
and saw his mission there to educate youths in the superior “American form of democracy.”11 He
went into the Columbia presidency with no illusions that he would contribute anything
academically. Instead, he desired to run the university efficiently through advancing education in
citizenship and supporting projects that could “help the educational world to improve and
perpetuate the American economic system.”12 This stance brought him into conflict with his
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faculty who generally just wanted the means to freely engage in intellectual pursuits and train
new generations of scholars. This conflict was exacerbated by the fact that Eisenhower was
bringing his conservative Americanist agenda to Columbia in the wake of the extended
presidency of Nicholas Murray Butler, who had already marginalized many Columbia scholars
throughout the years with his ardent anti-communist and anti-Semitic ideals.13 Furthermore,
despite his commitment to Columbia, Eisenhower’s priorities remained with the interests of the
Army and national security.14 This priority is evident from Eisenhower’s statement after stepping
down as Chief of Staff to assume leadership of Columbia that “I will never truly leave the
army.”15
Columbia University historian Richard Hofstadter’s Anti-Intellectualism in American Life
earned him a Pulitzer Prize and is one of the foremost works on the anti-intellectual traditions in
American life. The book embodies the historian’s reaction to the intense intellectual and political
turmoil of the late 1940’s and 1950’s.16 Throughout the book, Hofstadter essentially identifies
how anti-intellectualism has historically played into various aspects of American society
including politics, religion and education. He wanted to explain the logic behind certain sociopolitical happenings and trends of the 1950’s such as the rise of McCarthyism and Eisenhower’s
popularity as both politician and president. However, Hofstadter’s work also reflects a general
resentment on the part of Columbia faculty towards Eisenhower because of his presidential
predecessor and his “simple man” persona rather than his true views on intellect and education.
Colleen Shogan, agreeing with Hofstadter, asserts that Eisenhower’s “hidden hand” leadership as
13
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U.S. President began a trend of populist anti-intellectualism in the modern presidency. This trend
became a staple in GOP politics and contributed to the rise of such presidents as Ronald Reagan,
George W. Bush and now Donald Trump.17 However, Shogan’s analysis does not adequately
address how Eisenhower’s middle-of-the-road life philosophy, moderate political sensibilities
and cooperative attitude generally precluded him from engaging in ultra-conservative,
reactionary politics unlike some of his presidential successors in the GOP.
This paper examines how anti-intellectualism played into Eisenhower’s approach to
education as president of Columbia University. This was the first civilian political position he
held after leaving the military in 1947. It was also his initial foray into the Cold War as a civilian
official. It was at Columbia that Eisenhower largely developed his Cold Warrior persona. This
paper will also explain the origins and agencies of Cold War alarmism in order to identify the
pressures placed on Eisenhower, as a public figure and future potential U.S. President, to appear
favorable during a time when anti-communist influences in government, special interest groups
and the media wantonly defamed scholars and intellectuals as leftists, subversives or communist
sympathizers. Thus, the heightening of international Cold War political tensions and the
domestic reaction to these tensions weighed heavily on Eisenhower’s mind and was reflected in
his anti-communist rhetoric, loyalty policies, and emphasis on Americanism in education at
Columbia. It will argue that Eisenhower’s humble beginnings, his military upbringing and the
political arena of the early Cold War guided his actions and discourse as the intellectual overseer
of Columbia. This background motivated him to utilize the university institution to push through
patriotic, citizenship-oriented educational programs that emphasized the values of democracy,
loyalty and American progress over traditional scholarship and academia. Therefore,

17
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Eisenhower’s pre-conceived notions of what education should accomplish as well as the
restrictive and demanding nature of Cold War discourse influenced Ike to foster an environment
at Columbia not wholly conducive to traditional intellectual freedom and rigorous exploration of
ideas. However, this paper counter-argues that despite the pressures of the Cold War,
Eisenhower generally remained true to his moderate political sensibilities and actually helped
prevent the spread of McCarthyite anti-intellectualism at Columbia.
Background and Historiography
As Eisenhower was assuming his Columbia presidency in 1948, tensions in the
international arena were heating up dramatically between the United States and the Communist
bloc. Going back to the end of World War II, conflict had been growing between the US and the
USSR over territorial disputes in occupied Central Europe, the Near East and East Asia. Before
the Second World War had even concluded, Eisenhower himself helped fire up these brewing
conflicts by ceding the initial occupation of Berlin to the Russians without consulting the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, effectively marginalizing the presence of British forces in the area
under General Montgomery.18 Later, during “Operation Keelhaul,” Eisenhower helped repatriate
over two million wayward Russian soldiers back to the Soviet Union where many of them were
imprisoned in the Gulag or executed.19 These events, along with other concessions made by
Eisenhower to the Soviets during the Allied occupation of Europe, became a source of much
criticism towards Ike in the American anti-communist press.20 These territorial disputes
culminated, in 1948, with the communist putsch in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet blockade of
Berlin in opposition to the Marshall Plan, which essentially kicked the Cold War into high
18
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gear.21 Finally, the West’s loss of China to communism in 1949 further exacerbated the already
turbulent international Cold War and perpetuated the prominent domestic backlash in the United
States against anything or anyone considered sympathetic at all to the red cause. 22
In the U.S., domestic policies and a reactionary public brought the Cold War home. By
the late 1940s, the actions of the U.S. government helped legitimize the anti-communist
unanimity that set the stage for the majority of Americans to participate in or support the political
repressiveness that categorized the McCarthy era.23 The media colluded with the government
during this time, disseminating and amplifying the government’s message about the threat posed
by worldwide communism. Anti-communism became pervasive as every branch of the U.S.
government became involved with the cause in some form or another from the State Department
and Congress to the Post Office.24 Beginning as early as 1947, President Truman paved the way
for an ardent American anti-communist consensus with the Truman Doctrine and his Loyalty
Program. The Truman Doctrine was formulated in response to Soviet encroachment in Europe. It
affirmed an unlimited commitment by the United States to “support free people who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.”25 Then the Truman
administration used the communist coup in Czechoslovakia as grounds for launching the
Marshall Plan, which aimed to rehabilitate the economies of Western Europe in order to establish
an allied bulwark against the communist bloc behind the iron curtain.26
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Truman’s international diplomacy proved popular on the home front and contributed
greatly to his reelection in 1948 much to the dismay of the Republican Old Guard.27 This
unexpected triumph of the Democratic Party led the Republican Party to rethink their strategy for
taking the White House. Republicans decided they could not argue with Truman’s anticommunist measures in the international arena but they could focus on the issue of communism
at home. This led to the construction of the Republican myth that Democrats were soft on
domestic communism and precipitated public alarmism over the notion that foreign subversives
had infiltrated almost every facet of American life. As the Truman administration came under
attack by Republican anti-communist slander, President Truman fought back with actions aimed
at bolstering internal security. He inaugurated the Loyalty Security Program to create a
mechanism for testing the loyalty of federal employees.28 He also initiated the employment of
criminal prosecutions against individual communists and began to reorient the focus of state
security organizations, such as the FBI, around anti-communist measures.29 Thus, the Truman
Administration, under pressure from the Republican Old Guard, helped establish the
preeminence of an ideologically conservative anti-communist security agenda that would rapidly
seep into almost every aspect of American life, including education.30
Eisenhower’s tenure at Columbia (1948-1950) proved a training ground for the
cultivation of his Cold Warrior persona. While his time at Columbia has not been covered in
scholarship as extensively as other periods in his career, enough has been written about it to draw
conclusions about how his Cold War agenda there fell in line with American anti-intellectual
traditions as understood by Hofstadter. Firstly, this assertion that Eisenhower honed his Cold
27

Bischof, “Before the Break,” 23.
Schrecker and Deery, The Age of McCarthyism, 21.
29
Schrecker and Deery, 21-22.
30
Ibid., 22, 36.
28

8

Warrior persona at Columbia is backed up by Günter Bischof’s analysis of Eisenhower’s
Columbia presidency. Bischof explains that Eisenhower’s Columbia years marked his
acceptance of new East-West antagonisms and his slight discarding of his middle-of-the-road
personal philosophy.31 Travis Jacobs writes the most extensively on Eisenhower’s time at
Columbia and explains how Ike saw his Columbia presidency as part of his duty to his country.32
Jacob’s systematic analysis of Eisenhower’s Columbia years also reveals how his career at
Columbia gave him a forum for developing his political and Cold Warrior persona.33 It allowed
him a chance to educate youths in the “American form of democracy” and encouraged “the
practice of true cooperation among foreign nations.”34 He also notes that Eisenhower wondered
if his beliefs would fit in well with the academic world and argues that his general outlook
caused contention with many scholars at Columbia.35
Stephen Ambrose asserts, in agreement with Jacobs and historian Herbert Parmet, that
Eisenhower was not compatible with the super-intellectual climate of Columbia.36 He describes
Eisenhower’s educational philosophy as oriented around pragmatic and often political goals. And
using Columbia to produce better citizens was at the top of his agenda.37 This agenda aggravated
many of the professors who saw Eisenhower’s university goals as reducing Columbia education
to that of a high school civics class.38 Similarly, Jean Edward Smith comments on how
Eisenhower did not quite fit in at Columbia and embarrassed faculty by making speeches about

31
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the primary importance of citizenship in education over intellectual development.39 Thus,
historians generally agree Eisenhower’s outlook on education and his political maneuvering
regarding the emerging discourse of the Cold War often alienated many of his Columbia faculty.
He also subordinated intellectual freedom to his pragmatic agenda by primarily only using his
influence to promote programs and institutions that could help perpetuate his crusade for
Americanism.
However, while scholarship reveals that anti-intellectualism played a role in
Eisenhower’s Columbia administration, evidence also implies that he was never a virulent antiintellectual by any means. Scholarly consensus has shown that Eisenhower largely subscribed to
a middle-of-the-road philosophy in most aspects of his life, based on the values of cooperation,
moderation and reason, which Eisenhower saw as being at the foundation of American
civilization.40 His moderate beliefs based on his humble upbringing in Kansas led him to be a
moderate politician and statesman throughout his career. It motivated him to conciliate rather
than engage in partisan bickering and allowed him to present himself as being above politics in
general.41 Though Günter Bischof remarks that Eisenhower’s time at Columbia represented his
slight discarding of his middle-of-the-road philosophy in exchange for the polarized discourse of
the Cold War, other scholarship illuminates how his moderate outlook still kept him above the
political fray unlike the McCarthyites. For instance, Ambrose and Jacobs point out that
Eisenhower never disallowed freedom of thought or speech and he even declared there would be
no “intellectual iron curtain” at Columbia.42 Jacobs and Smith also mention how Eisenhower
consistently spoke out in advocacy of free speech and academic freedom such as when he
39
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defended a Marxist study group’s right to hold a conference with leftist speakers at Pupin Hall,43
or when he stood up for a member of his faculty who came under attack by Senator Joseph
McCarthy (R-WI).44 Eisenhower’s middle-of-the-road philosophy was a powerful force behind
his personality and it kept him from ever entertaining any true political repression or severe antiintellectualism during his time at Columbia or any other period in his life.
Though it is apparent that Eisenhower’s outlook, personality and the ideological demands
of the Cold War influenced him to adopt an educational agenda contrary to the traditional liberal
education established at Columbia, other evidence suggests that Eisenhower did harbor some
appreciation for the intrinsic values of intellectual enrichment. Personal correspondence between
Eisenhower and his close friend Edward “Swede” Hazlett reveal that Eisenhower was fascinated
with the intellectual opportunities available at such an institution as Columbia and was grateful
to be able to interact with scholarly minds of every discipline.45 Eisenhower’s intellectually
affirming view presented in multiple primary sources is backed up by scholarship about certain
aspects of his past. Both Allan Taylor and Jean Edward Smith write fairly extensively on how
Eisenhower came to be known as a “brain worker,” or a skilled technocrat and academician,
within the U.S. Army.46 This inconsistency over Eisenhower’s views on intellect can be partially
rectified by sources from the published Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers.
Correspondence from the Eisenhower Papers reveals that some of the patriotic
educational programs and reforms sponsored by Eisenhower at Columbia were part and parcel of
a larger Cold War agenda that he did not mastermind. These correspondences demonstrate that
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many highly influential people in American government and business, such as John D.
Rockefeller III and George C. Marshall, took great interest in Eisenhower’s Columbia presidency
and pledged money and support for him to actively pursue his education in citizenship
initiatives.47 Furthermore, allegations lobbied against Columbia by the anti-communist press and
anti-communist government organizations, such as the House Un-American Activities
Committee (HUAC), often frustrated Eisenhower and prompted him to react in a way that
showcased his patriotism at the expense of his faculty. Eisenhower’s attempts to cover all his
bases regarding the new pervasive discourse of anti-communism were especially important for
him to remain above respite as a national figure and an up-and-coming politician. Through an
analysis of these primary sources in conjunction with various histories of Eisenhower’s life and
time at Columbia, this paper will argue that Eisenhower’s subordination of intellect at Columbia
was influenced not only by his own preconceived notions of the role of ideas in American Cold
War society but by powerful anti-communist forces in American life. It will also explain how
Eisenhower’s Columbia agenda was viewed harshly by faculty because of previous issues they
had with President Butler. Thus, it will connect the dots between Hofstadter’s seminal work on
historical anti-intellectualism and Eisenhower’s early rise to the top of American politics.
Anti-Intellectualism and the Construction of Americanism
This analysis of how anti-intellectualism played into Eisenhower’s Columbia presidency
will be facilitated throughout this paper by Hofstadter’s historical theories presented in AntiIntellectualism in American Life. Hofstadter’s book not only explains how anti-intellectualism
played into the construction of the ideology of Americanism but also directly corresponds to

47
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Eisenhower’s educational and political agenda as Columbia University president.48 As a young
professor at Columbia during Eisenhower’s tenure there, Hofstadter witnessed first-hand how
Eisenhower’s priorities did not always fit well with the primary educational goals of such a
prestigious institution of higher learning. Hofstadter’s book is divided into three sections,
focused on how the anti-intellectual phenomenon is expressed as evangelical anti-rationalism,
American populism/anti-elitism, and unreflective instrumentalism, or the notion that intellect is
only valuable if it can be used to accomplish clear pragmatic goals.49 Hofstadter explains,
throughout the book, how these interrelated concepts have translated into anti-intellectualism in
American history in an attempt to mirror the anti-intellectual forces that influenced Eisenhower
as university president.
Eisenhower’s agenda as Columbia president can be categorized as largely populist and
pragmatic in origin.50 While evangelical anti-rationalism, or the disdain for the established
intellectual and philosophical doctrines of the clergy in exchange for the individualistic turn to
spiritual subjectivity, was a focal point in the various American evangelical revivalist
movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was not a powerful motivating force in
Eisenhower’s life.51 Though the evangelical tradition was certainly evident in some of
Eisenhower’s values such as his Protestant work ethic, his Pennsylvania-Dutch Mennonite
heritage, his extolling of cooperative effort and his notable faith in the Christian God,
Eisenhower was not by any means an exceptionally religious man.52 His humble beginnings and
his time in the military, however, shaped him into a populist patriot and a pragmatic doer rather
48
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than a philosopher of any kind. At Columbia, his populist leanings and patriotic sense of duty
influenced his anti-communist actions and drove his emphasis on citizenship education.
Similarly, his pragmatism drove his desire to focus on Columbia’s role as a leading national
institution that could produce valuable members of the American political economy and
cooperate to help solve many of the nation’s socio-political and economic issues.
On the Impractical and Subversive Nature of Intellect
Eisenhower’s populist political traditions were not exclusive to him but part of a larger
American tradition of anti-elitism, patriotism, alarmism and xenophobia. Beginning at least as
far back as the post-Revolutionary era, there was a fervent political backlash against the elite
intelligentsia engaged in high politics at the time. During and right after the Revolution,
American politics was mainly led by a learned patrician class. Most of the Founding Fathers
themselves were intellectuals and men of broad cultivation who used their wide understanding of
history, politics, law and science to solve the exigent problems of their day. Intellectual leaders
such as John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Benjamin Franklin and George
Wythe were considered sages of American democracy and were extolled for their insights and
scholarly acumen.53 However, this rule by the patrician elite was quickly supplanted by a
populist democracy when internal political strife and external threats, such as the fallout from the
French Revolution, caused extreme divisiveness among the original leaders of the United
States.54
Thomas Jefferson, in particular, became one of the first victims of anti-intellectual
reprisal in politics. When it appeared that Jefferson might succeed George Washington as
53
54
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president in 1796, Jefferson’s opponents within the Federalist Party criticized him as being unfit
for the presidency. His opponents asserted that Jefferson’s abstract philosophical theories and
doctrinaire leadership would be impractical in American politics.55 They also implied that his
affinity for the life of the mind (as well as his non-existent military contributions to the
Revolution) revealed his lack of moral character and patriotism, his potential demagoguery, and
his subscription to dangerous, foreign philosophical doctrines. They particularly used his interest
in French Revolutionary doctrines against him in asserting that he was an orchestrator of the
French Revolution and secretly desired to become a dictator like Bonaparte.56 The criticisms
leveled against Jefferson for his devotion to the life of the mind became a populist antiintellectual staple in American politics specifically since the Jacksonian era that was still very
much alive during Eisenhower’s time. The notion that intellect was impractical in American life
certainly weighed into Eisenhower’s emphasis on citizenship, programs geared towards
American progress, and practical courses of study as being of primary importance over
traditional scholarly subjects at Columbia. Furthermore, the emphasis on anti-communism in
education that blossomed out of the McCarthy era directly corresponds to the precedent for
attributing the life of the mind and those who represent it with foreign subversion established
during the post-Revolutionary period. Thus, intellectual pursuits came to represent the other in
American life.
Intellectual Pragmatism and the Conceptualization of the Brain Trust
After being relegated to a superfluous role in American politics since at least the
Jacksonian period, intellect came to be considered valuable again during the Progressive era of

55
56

Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, 146-147.
Ibid., 148.

15

the early twentieth century. Before the age of progress, intellect was seen as a hindrance to the
political process. Intellectual politicians were seen as weak, ineffective, indecisive and
effeminate if not also subversive.57 This changed with Theodore Roosevelt’s rise to power in
American politics. Theodore Roosevelt was a man of privileged background but he was also a
pioneer and a patriot. He owned ranches in the American West and was known for his love of
hunting and other masculine endeavors. His valor in the Spanish-American War leading the
Rough Riders brigade further solidified his image as a capable, patriotic and masculine leader
who was also intellectually inclined. He was also a pragmatist and urged Americans to commit
themselves to practical causes in politics.58 His persona not only helped dispel the myth of the
ineptitude of the elite intelligentsia but also paved the way for Progressivism by demonstrating
the intellectual had a useful part to play in the advancement of the nation.59
The utility of intellect became the major theme of the Progressive era with the rise of the
expert in politics. As American industry became increasingly complex and urbanized the need
for expertise in order to mobilize and direct such development grew exponentially. American
politics came to see the intellectual as a useful tool for the progress of the state. This new outlook
on intellect led many political reformers to merge intellectual expertise with political goals in the
form of a brain trust.60 The idea of the brain trust was initially conceptualized by Governor
Robert M. La Follete of Wisconsin in the late nineteenth century. La Follete believed that
universities could be utilized efficiently by the state in order to solve various socio-economic and
political issues that may arise. As governor of Wisconsin, he established a union between the
state government and the University of Wisconsin. The university served as a politically
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impartial source for information, statistics, advice, skill and training that could be utilized by
state officials for the benefit of the citizenry as a whole.61 La Follete’s brain trust became the
model for understanding the role of intellect and the university in state-building and would be
utilized by many prominent leaders including Franklin D. Roosevelt and Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Eisenhower specifically attempted to forge a Columbia brain trust, with little success, with his
American Assembly project.
The Americanization of Education
The convergence of anti-elitism, unreflective instrumentalism/intellectual pragmatism
and education came to the fore in American life with the life adjustment movement of the early
to mid-twentieth century, which was a movement led by reformers such as Charles Prosser to
make education more practical.62 During this time, the notion that traditional liberal education
was crucial to the overall development of young minds came under serious scrutiny by pioneers
in the new field of psychology. Classical liberal education was seen as based on faculty
psychology. The logic behind its efficacy was that the mind was composed of faculties, such as
reason, imagination and memory, and by training these faculties through rigorous mental
disciplines, such as Latin, Greek or mathematics, one could train the powers of the mind to better
confront whatever real-world tasks faced it.63 However, many experimental psychologists and
educational theorists including Edward Thorndike and Charles Prosser suggested the faculty
theory was flawed in that understanding gained through liberal mental disciplines did not transfer
into other aspects of the mind. This meant that liberal academia effectively did nothing to
strengthen the overall mental capabilities of a person but rather just filled the mind with pointless
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knowledge that could not be put to practical use.64 Thus, pragmatic science supplanted liberal
rationale in the construction of modern American education.
Enveloped in this practical vision of education was the belief also that American
education should reflect the values of democracy and the common man. Part of this process was
distancing from the traditional liberal elite paradigm of European education to focus more on
general utility and the moral cultivation of students.65 This process began in the 1870s when
educational reformers fought to universalize primary and secondary American education to break
away from the class-based system of education in most of Europe. While this mission was
predicated on creating an equitable educational arena for all students and not just a select elite
few, it also led to the exaltation of academic mediocrity.66 This universalization of education,
because of its inspiration in democratic thought, also brought with it a tendency among academic
administrators to conform curricula to American civic virtues above all else. This contrasted with
traditional ideals of liberal academia that pervaded in higher education. So began the movement
to disengage secondary education from its subordination to higher education. This process was
facilitated by new federal institutions such as the National Education Association (NEA). It
culminated, by the end of the First World War, in a reorientation of focus in public high school
studies towards effective education in citizenship and training for vocations in American
industry.67
This trend of incorporating civic virtues and American democracy into education grew
into a preeminent educational paradigm throughout the first half of the twentieth century.
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Education came to mirror politics as the two notions became inextricably intertwined with the
United States’ evolution into a world power during the first half of the twentieth century. During
times of political upheaval and unrest at home and abroad, the marriage between education and
the American value system (Americanism) became increasingly prominent. Particularly, social
revolution and the rise of communism along the fringes of Europe were viewed by policy makers
and educational leaders as one of the leading threats against the American way of life.68
This political and educational emphasis on anti-communism waxed and waned during
different periods of American red hysteria but largely came to the fore around the dawn of the
Cold War and the McCarthy era. Following the Second World War, the notion that high schools
should function as factories for producing a strong citizenry, opposed to foreign ideological
threats, became a central focus of the American educational agenda. This is evident from the
NEA’s statement in 1948 that schools should “indoctrinate our youth in the American way of life
so that they know it, believe in it, and live it continuously.”69 Anti-communism further infiltrated
the American education system through loyalty oaths imposed on teachers as well as through
congressional committees, such as HUAC, which emerged on both the national and regional
level in order to investigate suspected ties between educators (and other American professionals)
and un-American or communist activities.70 Thus, Americanism, or the philosophy of the
American way of life, and anti-communism became one and the same and were streamlined
through the education system especially during the dawn of the Cold War. Therefore, the stage
was set for Eisenhower, as a prominent American figure, to fall in line with this educational
agenda during his time at Columbia.
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Eisenhower’s Early Life, Education and Career in the Military
Dwight D. Eisenhower embodied the American ideal of the self-made man.71 Hailing
from the Great Plains cattle town of Abilene, Kansas, in the heartland of the USA, Eisenhower
represented the last remnants of a dying frontier culture that still rang with nostalgia in the
collective American consciousness. Growing up, Eisenhower’s family had little means at their
disposal as his parents had lost their inheritance on a failed business and were then forced to
support their five children with Eisenhower’s father David’s meager ten dollars a week railroad
salary.72 In the spirit of American determination, however, the Eisenhowers did not let bad
financial luck break their will to provide for their own. They eventually acquired a farm and
taught their children how to live off the land. It was on this farm in Abilene that Eisenhower
learned the values of hard work, self-reliance, and initiative. These became his credos throughout
his personal and professional adult life. However, this “simple man” philosophy, which was
reinforced by Eisenhower’s parents and the small town community of Abilene, also taught him
to accomplish things in life there was only time for rigorous effort, dedication and single-minded
focus, and little time for reflection, contemplation or introspection.73
This “simple man” philosophy molded his character and provided the basis for his
understanding of the deeper questions of existence, according to Allan Taylor. It instilled in him
a pragmatic approach to life’s major difficulties and affirmed him as a man of action who only
validated ideas if they worked in a practical sense.74 As Eisenhower grew up, his enormous
capacity for accomplishment and his determination to better himself led him to feel underutilized
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and unfulfilled in small town America, so he set out to obtain a formal college education.
Through rigorous hard work, studying with his friend Swede Hazlett, and networking,
Eisenhower finally received an appointment to the prestigious West Point Military Academy
where he honed his practical and academic skills and learned to be an officer and a leader.
At West Point, Eisenhower developed his sense of duty and service in addition to his
academic and social development. According to Ambrose, on Eisenhower’s first day at the
academy he realized he was meant to be a soldier as he watched, along with 264 other freshman,
the upper-classmen of the Corps of Cadets march past on the parade grounds in full dress
uniform as a perfectly synchronized unit with the band playing in the background.75 This regal
sight moved young Eisenhower to embrace his chosen path whole-heartedly and so he set out to
become a great officer. In the academy, he learned math, English and history, played sports such
as football and baseball, and endured hazing at the hands of upperclassmen, all serving to thicken
his skin and further instill in him the virtues of cooperation and determination. Eisenhower,
having been a lover of military history from a young age, also immersed himself in the rich and
venerated past of the West Point institution itself and was mesmerized by such sights as Ulysses
S. Grant and Robert E. Lee’s rooms and the field where George Armstrong Custer learned to
ride.76
More importantly, however, Eisenhower was indoctrinated into the military intellectual
milieu, which viewed education as a one way street and discouraged questioning as anathema to
the learning process. At West Point, custom generally dictated that there was no room for
discussion or contemplation of methods of instruction. The academy taught that for military
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education to be effective students must accept what was taught to them without inquiry unlike in
a traditional liberal arts college education. Conversely, Eisenhower’s brother Edgar was
attending Michigan State University at this time where everything was supposed to be
questioned and nothing universally accepted. In contrast, West Point was centered on rote
learning. The faculty emphasized English composition rather than literature and stressed factual
history rather than historical inquiry. A decent essay at West Point was generally a logical
presentation of fact rather than a critical or abstract analysis. Eisenhower’s own course of study
was narrow and technical concerned predominantly with basic civil and military engineering.77
Rote memorization impersonated creative thought at West Point despite changing trends in
higher education, which is likely a reason the institution was in decline at the time of
Eisenhower’s appointment there.78
The intellectual environment at West Point shaped Eisenhower’s pragmatic and patriotic
values. Such mechanical clarity aided him to become a great officer and general but contributed
much to both his strengths and weaknesses as a civilian official and politician. The educational
philosophy of West Point not only subordinated individual intellect to collective growth and
achievement but also viewed individualism as potentially dangerous. Most importantly,
interwoven in Eisenhower’s education were the concepts of dedication and duty to country,
which guided his path throughout the military and into his civilian career. While West Point
largely shaped Eisenhower as a man and a leader, it also made him susceptible to the military’s
prejudices, expectations and traditions.79
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After graduating from West Point in 1915, Second Lieutenant Eisenhower employed his
education as a staff and training officer for the Army. Eisenhower’s first assignment was to the
19th Infantry regiment at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, TX, in September 1915.80 At this
time, the First World War had been underway in Europe for over a year and the prospect of
American intervention had become an increasingly real possibility. Eisenhower recognized this
potential outcome for the country and saw it as an obligation and an opportunity to rigorously
apply the knowledge he gained from the Academy to his work in order to prove his merit as an
officer and fulfill his duty to his nation.81 He was successful in this endeavor and was soon
promoted to first lieutenant and transferred around the country as a training camp instructor.82
After Woodrow Wilson’s request to Congress for a declaration of war against Germany in April
1917, Eisenhower was assigned various instructor duties, which eventually led him to his
position as commander of the tank-training center at Camp Colt in Gettysburg, PA. Eisenhower,
who was a tank enthusiast with great organizational skills, thrived in this position and helped
make Camp Colt into one of the most efficient tank-training facilities in the country. For his
accomplishments there, Eisenhower was recognized by the military for his talents. This
eventually led to his wartime promotion up to the rank of lieutenant colonel. However, to
Eisenhower’s chagrin, his talents as a trainer prevented him from receiving any appointments in
the field overseas and so his aspirations for valor in war were never realized during WWI.83
Thus, Eisenhower’s military career largely became centered on his abilities as an efficient
instructor and staff officer. These abilities would later transfer to his role as head administrator at
Columbia.
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Between the First and Second World Wars, Eisenhower’s prestige as an organizer and
staff instructor continued to grow, affording him many opportunities to make his mark on the
military. In 1922, after being befriended by Brigadier General Fox Connor, Eisenhower was
appointed as Connor’s second-in-command of an American brigade in the Panama Canal Zone.
In Panama, Eisenhower proved his merit to Connor by tightening up discipline and improving
the brigades overall tactical performance.84 Furthermore, under Connor’s guidance, Eisenhower
became well versed in the theory and philosophy of military and political strategy. Connor
exposed him to the works of such great thinkers as Plato, Tacitus, Nietzsche and Clausewitz.
Eisenhower took a particular interest in Clausewitz and read On War three times (in stark
contrast with his reputation for never reading).85
Later, Eisenhower was accepted into the Command and General Staff College at Fort
Leavenworth where he graduated in 1926 at the top of his class. Following his graduation from
the General Staff College, he attended the War College in 1927. There he learned grand strategy
and received superior ratings in all his subjects.86 Then Eisenhower worked for the American
Battle Monuments Commission in Washington, organizing data for a guidebook on American
battlefields in France. This assignment earned him a commendation from General John J.
Pershing, the commanding general of American troops in WWI. On assignment in the
Philippines, he also helped establish the Army Industrial College and the Philippine Military
Academy and assisted in writing the Commonwealth Defense Act during this time.87 These
accomplishments within the sphere of military planning and education earned Eisenhower the
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title of “brain worker” in the Army. They point to his intelligence, craftiness and industriousness
in contrast to certain historians’ image of Ike as just a simple man from Abilene.88
Eisenhower’s Ideology and Cold War Discourse
Eisenhower’s ideological predisposition is discussed by scholars such as Allan Taylor
and Ira Chernus. Taylor credits the frontier tradition of Abilene with playing a crucial role in the
molding of Eisenhower’s character and determining of Eisenhower’s responses to the greater
questions of existence and purpose.89 Taylor deduces that Eisenhower’s upbringing in Abilene
made him a man of action who saw philosophic contemplation as a luxury in which he could not
afford to indulge. He then explains how this disposition, along with endless dedication, a strong
sense of duty and a willingness to always work hard, allowed Eisenhower to excel in the military
as a sharp staff officer.90 Ira Chernus attempts to delve even deeper into the mind of Eisenhower
through an analysis of his discourse that systematically identifies and discusses the composite
elements of his ideological underpinnings. Chernus sheds light on how Eisenhower’s discourse
reveals a disposition towards seeing practical success and ideological commitment as closely
intertwined in reality.91 Taylor and Chernus’s analyses help explain various motivations behind
Eisenhower’s actions and viewpoints during his military and civilian careers regarding such
subjects as communism, capitalism, democracy and education.
Chernus also devotes particular attention to Eisenhower’s Cold War discourse in order to
demonstrate how the ideological underpinnings of the Cold War influenced his post-WWII
career and presidential rhetoric. Chernus asserts that since the Cold War was a conflict in which
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words and ideas were the main “currencies of combat,”92 it is reasonable to assume that the
psychological effects of the Cold War on the United States’ leaders and the general populace as a
whole are evident in most forms of popular discourse. Eisenhower’s discourse is no exception as
he quickly and naturally assumed the role of Cold Warrior (despite the fact that he had
previously advocated cooperation and compromise with the Soviets) after U.S. relations with the
Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated after the end of WWII, and conciliation became less likely.93
Chernus argues that popular Cold War discourse generally consisted of Manichean and
apocalyptic elements dichotomized alongside a realist agenda, which served to arouse a nervous
and reactionary populace and rally support for security actions.94 Eisenhower’s particular brand
of discourse, which was influenced by his experience in WWII, utilized this paradigm effectively
and was often heavy-handed on the apocalyptic aspects, which earned him the nick name
“Alarmist Ike” in the military.95 Thus, Eisenhower’s Cold War discourse, which was coming to
the fore in 1947 and 1948, naturally transferred over into his administration at Columbia.
Anti-Intellectualism in Eisenhower’s Columbia Presidency
As soon as Eisenhower became president of Columbia University in 1948, he set out to
reorganize aspects of the establishment there for the sake of efficiency and political
maneuvering. Firstly, he had the University President’s House at 60 Morningside Drive in
Ossining, NY completely renovated and remodeled at great expense to Columbia. While the
Columbia community assumed the newly refurbished four-story building would be utilized for
university functions, Eisenhower disappointed many by using the house primarily for his own
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leisure and entertaining his rich and powerful friends.96 He also utilized the assistance of
administrative aides Kevin McCann and Major Robert Schulz to help organize the office of the
president. With Schulz and McCann as his lieutenants, Eisenhower created a military-style
hierarchical pecking order that kept him from directly engaging his staff and took many of the
day-to-day presidential duties out of his hands.
This aggravated other members of the administration such as former Acting President
Frank Fackenthal who saw this disconnect between the university and the president’s office as
inconvenient and problematic: “It is desirable that you be familiar with what goes over the
President’s desk [Fackenthal to the provost].” Fackenthal saw this development as a “tactical
mistake” and implied that the General’s assistants did not understand how to properly aid a
university president: “They were still protecting a world figure, instead of putting him into a new
community.”97 Administration and faculty were also displeased at Eisenhower’s over-reliance on
Provost Albert C. Jacobs as a proxy when he could not or would not attend various university
functions and events.98 This detachment demonstrated, to many in the faculty, the General’s lack
of interest in connecting with the university and engaging in academic affairs, which led some of
them to resent his administration.
Eisenhower’s discourse and agenda at Columbia also tended to marginalize his faculty as
it belittled their devotion to scholasticism in favor of emphasizing the Americanization of
education. One of the major topics of Eisenhower’s discourse at this time was progress and, in
the spirit of Rooseveltean utilitarianism, he set out to remake Columbia as an institution focused
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on producing valuable experts and researchers for the American political economy.99 Though
this focal point of Eisenhower’s Columbia presidency was not a position that could be
considered categorically anti-intellectual, his work at the university reflected the single-minded
industriousness and appreciation of cooperative effort that had directed his youthful
achievements and career in the Army. It also demonstrated his tendency to look for the fruits of
intellectualism through a predominantly pragmatic gaze.
At the core of his efforts was adopting an anti-communist/patriotic educational agenda at
the university that emphasized loyalty and citizenship as paramount. These values guided his
administrative actions and discourse throughout his Columbia tenure, often to the chagrin of
faculty who, at times, felt questioned and marginalized by Eisenhower’s focus on patriotism.
These values were also consistent with Eisenhower’s tendency towards alarmism over potential
subversion as well as the preeminence he placed in duty to his country, traits he largely
developed during his military education and career. They also reflected the turning tides in postWWII global affairs that brought on a new national Cold War discourse based on paranoia and
alarm and obsessed with loyalty and patriotism. Leading national figures such as Eisenhower had
to subscribe to this discourse and participate in its perpetuation in order to remain relevant and
unquestionable in character. This Cold Warrior stance on education was viewed negatively by
most intellectuals at Columbia.
Finally, Eisenhower’s induction into the Columbia community came at a time when
tensions were already running high because of the faculty revolt against Nicholas Murray
Butler’s domineering and hardline conservative approach to governing the university. Butler was
a staunch anti-communist, an anti-Semite, and a right-wing crusader for American patriotism
99

Ambrose, Eisenhower, 482.

28

who had presided over Columbia for nearly half a century (1902-1945). Though he was, himself,
a PhD scholar, he was more a pragmatic man of action than a man of contemplation. He devoted
his time and energy to establishing professionalized organizations at Columbia, such as the
Teachers College, rather than fostering ideas.100 He also had very limited tolerance for
intellectual criticism of the U.S. government or the American way of life on Columbia campus.
During the First World War, Butler terminated multiple professors for criticizing the war effort
including economics instructor Leon Fraser and psychology professor J. McKeen Cattell. 101
Later, in 1933, he invited Nazi ambassador to the U.S., Hans Luther, to speak at Columbia
despite enormous protest on campus from anti-fascist and socialist contingents in both the
faculty and student body. This event turned violent when campus police proceeded to beat
protesters who refused to move back from the perimeter and allow the meeting to commence.102
Events such as these demonstrated Butler’s willingness to quell dissent and suppress free speech
and free thought by any means necessary. His presence at Columbia agitated and alienated many
scholars including PhD student Richard Hofstadter who referred to him as “vain and
imperious.”103 His legacy set the stage for Eisenhower, who came to Columbia with a slightly
conservative Americanist vision of what education should accomplish, to be crucified as a
contiguous symbol of unchecked university authority.
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Eisenhower’s Citizenship Education Crusade
Eisenhower’s inaugural address at Columbia set the stage for his presidential agenda and
demonstrated how anti-intellectualism would play into his administration. Immediately, his
rhetoric is reminiscent of a rousing wartime speech on the exceptionalism of democracy. It did
not address Columbia’s role as an institution of free intellectual learning and exploration.
Instead, Eisenhower extolled the university’s supposed role as a molder of American citizens. He
beseeched the university community to fulfill its duty to America by cooperating in unison for
the betterment of the American nation especially in the face of hostile, opposing ideologies.104
Early on in his inaugural speech, Eisenhower compared educators to soldiers and stated that the
fundamental purpose of both categories was “the protection and perpetuation of basic human
freedoms.”105 He went on to explain that these freedoms were under attack by the rising tide of
“regimented statism.” He argued that education’s primary goal was to orient young minds to the
values of American democracy: “All must be joined in a common profession—that of
democratic citizenship; every institution within our national structure must contribute to the
advancement of this profession.” At the core of his statement was the notion that democratic
citizenship’s “perpetuation and proper use is the first function of our education system.”106
Eisenhower’s focus on the supreme importance of democracy and citizenship within the
American system of education demonstrated his Americanist viewpoint that the central purpose
of learning was to better understand and contribute to the collective American way of life.
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Eisenhower’s extolling of the virtues of American citizenship and democracy in his
inaugural address was confirmed in much of his private correspondence and played a central role
in his Columbia agenda. In a letter to Senator Arthur Capper (R-KS), he explained: “In my
inaugural address I took the subject of “Democratic Citizenship” because I felt I’d like to be
four-square before the educational world, and the public, as a believer in the American System—
that to combat destructive “isms” was the one remaining public purpose of my life [author’s
emphasis].”107 Eisenhower’s inaugural address and subsequent correspondence with Senator
Capper revealed the ideological undertones of the post-WWII/Cold War arena and is consistent
with Eisenhower’s patriotic sense of duty as well as his alarmist world view that every facet of
free American society was at war with the totalitarianism prevailing abroad. The notion that
Eisenhower saw his final public purpose in combating destructive “isms” demonstrated his view
that education can be utilized as a weapon against harmful ideologies, particularly communism.
Eisenhower’s emphasis on democratic citizenship in education as a way to preserve American
freedom and combat oppositional ideologies became a major focal point of his administration.
Eisenhower was inspired to undertake this crusade for citizenship by his experience
leading GIs in the Second World War. On the eve of the American invasion of North Africa in
1942, Eisenhower wrote to a friend at Fort Leavenworth:
The Allied cause is completely bound up with the rights and
welfare of the common man. You must make certain that every GI
realizes that the privileged life he has led is under direct threat.
His right to speak his own mind, to engage in any profession of his
own choosing, to belong to any religious denomination, to live in
any locality where he can support himself and his family, and to be
sure of fair treatment when he might be accused of any crime—all
of these would disappear if the Nazis win this war.108
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Eisenhower’s belief that the Allied cause was based on the virtues of American populist
democracy emphasized the critical importance of democratic citizenship in his mind. According
to Eisenhower’s friend and Dean of the Columbia Graduate School of Business, Phillip Young,
Ike later took the notion of championing democratic citizenship to heart while leading troops in
Europe as Supreme Allied Commander. Young recalls Eisenhower told him that during pep talks
with groups of GI’s, he was consistently asked the question, “General, what are we fighting for,
anyway?”109 Eisenhower struggled with this question throughout his time in the War but he
eventually embraced the belief that democratic citizenship was the only true answer. Through
exposing the masses to the inclusive and fair system of democratic citizenship, the appeal of
regimented statism and totalitarian rule would cease to exist. Young surmised that Eisenhower’s
notion of democratic citizenship as the key to battling global tyranny weighed heavily on his
decision to accept the offer made to him for the Columbia presidency. Columbia presented
Eisenhower with the chance to continue his duty to his country and, in the words of Young, “get
across to the youths of America what it all meant.”110
One of the major ways Eisenhower fulfilled his duty to press forward with his citizenship
initiative at Columbia was through the Citizenship Education Project (CEP). This project, for
which Eisenhower initially secured nearly half a million dollars from the Carnegie
Foundation,111 was created, according to Willis Griffin and Allen Felix, to “provide resources
and services to assist collaborating schools to improve their programs in citizenship
education.”112 Eisenhower, along with William Russell, the president of Columbia’s Teachers
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College, went to great lengths to bring the CEP into reality and promote it on a national scale.113
The project was part of Eisenhower’s efforts to make Columbia “a more effective and productive
member of the American national team.”114 The project set out to enhance civic pride in high
school and college students and emphasized practical experience in the “exercise of citizenship
in local communities.”115 Eisenhower believed that, without such initiatives, Columbia would be
just another “mere center of independent thought;” an isolated elitist institution where
“professors could live and die in the most highly cultured and understanding atmosphere in the
world.”116 Eisenhower’s citizenship agenda brought him into conflict with his faculty. Many in
his faculty preferred the conventional elitist model, which gave them the freedom to engage in
intellectual pursuits as they saw fit without having to adhere by the president of the institution’s
agenda. Furthermore, Eisenhower’s work with the CEP and other education projects often
proved to consume the majority of his fundraising efforts and the time he devoted to his
presidency. He regularly frustrated the Columbia administration and faculty, who had to pick up
his slack and felt cheated by his favoritism. 117
By 1952, Eisenhower had helped to bring the CEP to national prominence by forging a
link, with the help of George C. Marshall, between the project and the Armed Forces through a
citizenship oriented training program. By this time, the CEP had secured up to $1.45 million
from the Carnegie Foundation to operate and was involved with over five hundred school
systems in thirty-six states and over one hundred thousand students.118 The CEP’s rise to
prominence was not looked upon favorably by the many in his faculty. Columbia Provost
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Grayson Kirk commented that Eisenhower’s enthusiasm for the project provoked significant
“grumbling” on campus. Many faculty members, including Kirk, renowned economist Eli
Ginzberg and historian Jacques Barzun viewed the CEP as promoting a limited view of what
education should aspire to accomplish.119 They took issue with Eisenhower’s promotional
speeches for the CEP, which tended to assert that the primary goal of education was to create
good citizens. They also did not appreciate Eisenhower’s favoritism towards the Teachers
College and felt that he was devoting the majority of his time and fundraising to an affiliated
institution that, according to Jacque Barzun, “was not the most important school on campus.”120
Essentially, they viewed the CEP as a fool’s errand that trivialized Columbia’s reputation as a
center of higher learning and scholastic research.121 This is evident from Eli Ginzberg’s
statement: “If there is anything to make the Columbia campus feel that its president is miscast, it
is to get mixed up with Teachers College in some kind of a civics program.”122 Even William
Russell admitted that Teachers College suffered alienation from the rest of Columbia because of
Eisenhower’s strong presence there.
American Cold War Interest in Eisenhower’s Citizenship Education Initiative
Other evidence suggests that Eisenhower’s democratic citizenship initiative was spurred
on by the political pressures of the Cold War and Columbia’s need for funding and positive
publicity. While Eisenhower’s patriotic sense of duty and experience in WWII certainly
influenced him to spearhead this initiative, there is evidence that points to the idea that powerful
external interest in his university plans may have coaxed him to pursue this citizenship agenda
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more wholeheartedly than had no one taken an interest in his presidency. In a letter from May
1948 to Mary Francis Naiden, the widow of Eisenhower’s friend Colonel Earl Naiden,
Eisenhower expresses his interest in citizenship training. However, he regrettably states that he
could not sponsor a citizenship education program at that time because he had not yet officially
been inducted into his presidential position at Columbia.123 Apparently, the concept of creating
an Education for Citizenship community program was Mrs. Naiden’s idea and she had implored
Eisenhower to sponsor it personally. The tone of the letter is regretful with a slight undertone of
guilt as if Eisenhower had reneged on a promise. The Eisenhower Papers confirm this tone in the
notes, where a previous statement from Naiden to Ike stated that she had decided to decline an
appointment to the Army “in view of your promise [author’s emphasis] to help me get the
Education for Citizenship started.”124
In a later correspondence with William Russell in March 1950, Eisenhower discussed
how John D. Rockefeller III, business tycoon and chairman of the board of trustees of Colonial
Williamsburg, had taken an interest in their “Citizenship Training” program. Rockefeller, who
was a financial contributor to Columbia, was also engaged in a project to restore the colonial
town of Williamsburg in an effort to “sustain interest in American history and American
institutions.” He expressed ample interest in the Columbia citizenship initiative. It directly
correlated with Rockefeller’s own patriotic agenda and so he was of the belief that he and
Eisenhower could collaborate with their respective projects.125 Such correspondence presents
evidence that influential members of business and government were heightening Cold War
interest in the patriotic agenda, which inclined Eisenhower, as a prominent national figure, prime
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promoter for the Columbia institution, and future potential U.S. President, to passionately pursue
his Columbia citizenship education initiative with dedication and focus.
Columbia: Eisenhower’s Engine of Progress
Eisenhower’s inaugural address displayed a blatant disregard for education geared
towards highly intellectualized thought or specialized knowledge. He stressed the importance of
education’s role as a preserver and protector of human freedom: “At all levels of education it is
important that our schools do not become so engrossed in techniques, great varieties of
fractionalized courses, highly specialized knowledge and the size of their physical plant as to
forget the principle purpose of education itself—to prepare the student for an effective personal
and social life in a free society.”126 Eisenhower’s statement here revealed his anti-intellectual
stance towards the liberal concept of education.127 He implied that a focus on the mere study of
ideas was impractical and essentially distracted students from the greater goal of education. He
aimed at teaching students how to become useful, productive and socially and ideologically
sound citizens. Eisenhower’s definition of the principle purpose of education, “to prepare
students for an effective personal and social life in a free society,” is particularly revealing. His
use of the word effective implied that education’s primary function was to make individuals
useful for the greater collective system of free American society rather than to encourage
individual growth through intellectual contemplation and exploration. Eisenhower’s words
demonstrated his pragmatic notion that intellect is generally only useful when it can be used to
achieve practical ends and that the more contemplative and abstract aspects of intellect are of far
less importance.
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Eisenhower’s preference for intellectual pragmatism is evident in the programs and
projects he promoted and supported at Columbia. Early on in his Columbia career, he supported
the trustee’s decision to expand the School of Business into a graduate school with an extensive
program. He saw improving education in business at Columbia as a potentially crucial step
towards fulfilling his mission of “improving and perpetuating the American economic
system.”128 Similarly, he established a new Engineering Center to help Columbia produce more
valuable experts to aid in the construction of American infrastructure.129 He also established the
American Assembly (AA), which was his favorite program he sponsored at Columbia, next to
his cherished CEP.130 The Assembly was an attempt to forge a Columbia University brain trust
that would prove useful to the American political economy. It brought together leading
businessman, financiers, professors, government officials and labor bosses to brainstorm over the
basic political and social questions affecting the United States.131 Eisenhower saw this project as
the “most important step” he had taken at Columbia as it would facilitate cooperation among the
elite intellectual, industrial and governmental strata in order to benefit the collective American
good.132
As part of a Rooseveltian plan to aid national progress, the American Assembly was
spurred on largely as a Cold War initiative to help support American infrastructure and
democracy. The Assembly discussed major internal issues in American society such as taxes and
labor legislation in an attempt to find ways to improve systems of commerce and government
while preserving institutionalized democratic ideals and values. For instance, in a conversation
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with a potential donor, Eisenhower explained, “We have always known that a democracy could
be destroyed by creeping paralysis from within. Bureaucratic controls, deficit spending,
subsidies, and just plain hand-outs may, in certain emergencies, be required; but their cumulative
effect could produce dictatorship.”133 This statement revealed, once again, Eisenhower’s Cold
War alarmism over encroaching foreign “isms” and demonstrates how the Assembly was, in
part, a tool set up by Eisenhower as a defense mechanism against drastic ideological, economic
and political threats. This pro-capitalist purpose of the American Assembly caused many of the
professors at Columbia to view it simply as an anti-New Deal organization, which largely
discredited it as an effective engine of progress in their eyes.134 The conservative undertones of
the American Assembly were made further clear to the Columbia faculty by Eisenhower’s
association with financial contributors to the project from the oil industry such as the ultraconservative and staunch anti-communist founder of Hunt Oil, H.L. Hunt.135
American Cold War Interest in Eisenhower’s Intellectual Defense against Communism
Despite the Columbia faculty’s lack of enthusiasm for the American Assembly,
Eisenhower devoted a great deal of his efforts at the university towards promoting it. The onset
of the Korean War, especially, generated ample interest from financiers in Eisenhower’s brain
trust bulwark against communism. Days after the initial engagement between North Korean
forces and American troops, Eisenhower spoke on behalf of the Assembly to an alarmed press in
Minneapolis about the Korean crisis and the university’s role in preserving democracy: “We
believe that universities—and we want Columbia to take the lead—can be of more use to the
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world today.”136 Later, in Denver, Eisenhower launched his “Crusade for Freedom” speech,
which received nationwide coverage, to stress the nation’s “aspirations for peace” and “constant
readiness to cooperate” to prevent war and oppression at home and in the global arena.137
Eisenhower’s lobbying for the Assembly in Minnesota and Denver in the wake of the Korean
War drew the interest of many corporate financiers including Hunt Oil, Standard Oil, and
General Mills.138
This corporate interest inspired Eisenhower to promote the Assembly on a national level,
which perturbed many of his Columbia faculty who saw the Assembly as not being an integral
part of the university. The Columbia intellectual, instead, saw the Assembly as counter-intuitive
to the central purposes of the Columbia institution. As one former graduate school dean at
Harvard noted regarding Columbia professor’s thoughts on the General’s emphasis on the AA:
“Faculty members consider the teaching and training of new generations of graduate school
students as their highest calling.”139 The Assembly did not emphasize this notion at all. Columbia
Provost Grayson Kirk viewed the Assembly as “a naïve or innocent approach to
education…extremely simplistic.”140 Furthermore, Eisenhower’s fixation with the Assembly
demonstrated, to many at Columbia, the General’s disinterest with the university itself, which
widened the gap between him and the academic community. Eisenhower’s willful departure
from traditional Columbia life in favor of pursuing the politically charged American Assembly
project, and his open association with ultra-conservative financiers, in Eli Ginzberg’s words:
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“added to the marginality of his administration.”141 It caused increasing resentment on the part of
Columbia intellectuals towards Eisenhower’s association with the university.142
Loyalty Politics and Anti-Communism at Columbia
The clearest example of how Eisenhower subscribed to anti-intellectualism at Columbia
was through his emphasis on loyalty as a paramount goal of his administration. Eisenhower’s
preoccupation with loyalty, which often went hand-in-hand with his focus on citizenship, is
evident from much of his public and private rhetoric during his Columbia years. It also was
consistent with his notion of personal duty to country as well as his inherent alarmist nature
regarding foreign subversion. Eisenhower’s focus on loyalty in education was also distinctly
influenced, both internally and externally, by the particular impending threat of the Cold War.
Internally, the growing international Cold War tensions of this time, such as the breakdown of
negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union over the Soviet blockade of
Berlin, caused Eisenhower much distress. This distress becomes evident from the alarmism
present in many of his private correspondences. In a letter to Secretary of Defense James
Forrestal about the Berlin blockade, he noted, “They [the Soviets] seem, however, to be so sure
of themselves that I am beginning to think that they may push the rest of the world beyond
endurance. Frankly, the prospects look darker to me this Monday morning than they have yet
and, goodness knows that we have had no really encouraging news since the fall of 1945.”143
Eisenhower’s alarm over Soviet aggression and the spread of communism translated into
his fixation with the loyalty of Columbia’s faculty and staff. Externally, the nation’s paranoia
over assumed Soviet infiltration and many American’s general distrust of intellectuals also
141
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placed pressure on Eisenhower to rigorously adopt this loyalty agenda. For instance, in a letter to
fervent anti-communist William Burnham in November 1948, Eisenhower discussed allegations
of communism leveled by HUAC against Columbia University as well as himself personally. He
explained that “I don’t have to defend myself against the charge of Communism and, strange as
it seems, I have frequently and publicly supported the investigative functions of Congressional
Committees and sincerely believe they are a valuable feature of our government.”144 So
Eisenhower was not always above Cold War suspicion himself. He had to work extra vigorously
to enforce his agenda of loyalty at Columbia if only to protect his own character from being
defamed.
Eisenhower’s loyalty agenda is well laid out in a public memorandum about the Teachers
College written to Columbia alumni and friends on February 3, 1949. This memorandum, written
to appeal to alumni for contributions and support, details Eisenhower’s admiration for the
Teachers College and teachers in general. After a couple paragraphs of praise, Eisenhower brings
up the question of loyalty at the Teachers College. He states, “Once in a while I have heard
remarks about “pinkos” [people sympathetic to red communism] at TC [Teachers College].”145
He then goes on to clarify that these remarks were unfounded and that the first mission of the
Teachers College was to “prepare our youths for effective citizenship in a free democracy.”146
Eisenhower’s apparent purpose in this letter was to explain, to potential contributors, that
Columbia’s Teachers College faculty was comprised of loyal patriots who had the greater duty of
American citizenship as their main goals in education and were not susceptible to communist
sympathy. Eisenhower’s comment about remarks regarding the presence of “pinkos” at TC
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demonstrates the evident external pressure placed on Ike to make sure his staff was completely
trustworthy in the public eye. Thus, the faculty’s loyalty became a central goal in Eisenhower’s
administration largely because of the public Cold War distrust of intellectuals and educators.
Eisenhower’s Emphasis on Loyalty in Education
Eisenhower’s internal fixation with the loyalty of his staff is evident from his
correspondences and speeches. In his view, patriotism, rather than intellectual rigor and scholarly
capability, was the ultimate mark of an effective educator. The anecdote cited earlier about the
interchange between Eisenhower and the scholar over the efficacy of the faculty at Columbia and
Eisenhower’s response that it does not matter how great the professors were intellectually if they
were not great citizens, sums up Eisenhower’s prevailing attitude towards intellectuals and is a
notable aspect in many of his interchanges. This attitude revealed that Eisenhower saw loyalty
and patriotism as the primary duty of all educators. It also demonstrated an air of distrustful
alarm towards intellectuals in that he found it necessary to judge their loyalty before even
acknowledging their scholarly gifts. For instance, in one correspondence with Secretary of
Defense James Forrestal, Eisenhower discussed the Russian Institute at Columbia and states that,
“the head of the Institute Geroid T. Robinson, appeals to me as a patriotic, public spirited type of
great maturity and judgement.”147 In a Western Union telegram to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
(R-MA), Eisenhower wrote about controversy over the new Chair of Polish Studies at Columbia.
He clarified that “this professor was picked by the board and the sole condition that I applied was
that the man selected had to be loyal to America and to the former Polish government.”148 In
both these letters, Eisenhower demonstrated his opinion that loyalty and patriotism were more
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important than intellectual capability. Especially professors affiliated with education programs
relevant to the Cold War, Russian and Polish studies, needed to be reliable patriots as educators.
The prevailing currents of fervid anti-communism specifically influenced Eisenhower to
enforce loyalty at Columbia. This is evident from sources such as Eisenhower correspondence
with Associate Professor of Education Clyde Raymond Miller of Teacher’s College. According
to Miller’s friend Methodist Bishop Lewis O. Hartman, Miller was terminated for apparently
being, “radical in his views on social and economic questions.”149 Miller appealed to Eisenhower
on the grounds that he was unlawfully terminated based on a violation of his academic freedom.
But Eisenhower resolutely refused to help, stating he had no recourse because the trustees of
Teachers College and trustees of Columbia had already ratified the decision. However,
Eisenhower later defended the University’s decision to terminate Miller because of his
sympathetic views towards communism. He clarified his view in regards to the whole situation
that “our universities must be alert against all the insidious ways in which freedom can be
lost.”150 This statement revealed Eisenhower’s predisposition to believe that leftist intellectuals
could pose a threat to the preservation of American freedom, which was, in his mind, the main
goal of all American education. Eisenhower’s refusal to stand up for Miller and willingness to
challenge faculty was not taken graciously by many of the Columbia professors who saw his
actions as distinctly anti-intellectual.151
The Anti-Communist Vendetta against Columbia
A case similar to Miller’s was that of Arthur Coleman and the controversy over the
Columbia chair of Polish studies. Arthur Coleman, a professor of Polish language and literature,
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resigned over Columbia’s cooperation with the Polish communist government in the
establishment of the Adam Mickiewicz Chair of Polish Studies. Eisenhower saw the Chair as a
program established to facilitate “an exchange of knowledge affecting the cultures of the various
nations of the world.” Coleman, supported by the journalist Sigmund J. Sluszka, saw it as part of
a Cominform plot to infiltrate American universities and persuade impressionable youths of the
benefits of a communist system.152 This controversy snowballed. It led to Eisenhower personally
being implicated as soft on communism and possibly disloyal. Sluszka wrote to the New York
Times about, “Cominform infiltration into Columbia” in a brash attempt to bring to light the
suspected disloyalty present at Columbia.153 The tables were turned in this scenario as
Eisenhower became the moderate voice of intellectual reason in the face of harsh allegations
aimed at his loyalty and the loyalty of his faculty and staff. Interestingly enough, despite
allegations that Eisenhower and the Columbia institution were possibly complicit in a
Cominform plot vis a vis the Adam Mickiewicz Chair, Eisenhower divulged in the previously
mentioned telegram to Senator Lodge that that the true purpose of the Chair was to open up a
line of cultural penetration into the Soviet Union.154 So while Eisenhower was criticized by the
anti-communist press at home for his support of the Adam Mickiewicz Chair, said support had
specific anti-communist aims in the international arena.
Columbia’s reputation for the questionable loyalty of its faculty reverberated on
Eisenhower’s own reputation multiple times throughout his short university tenure. In one
instance, Eisenhower was threatened with a summons from HUAC to testify to the loyalty of his
staff. In the aforementioned letter to William Burnham, Eisenhower discussed the possibility of
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being questioned by a Congressional committee and insisted that he did not have to defend
himself against allegations of communism. However, in the end, he revealed some uneasiness
over the committee’s investigation into Columbia: “Of course, there may be angles to the
Committee’s purpose of which I am totally unaware. Nevertheless, I am perfectly willing to
answer any questions regarding myself or this institution as fully and frankly as I possibly
can.”155 Eisenhower’s squabble with HUAC began when he angered HUAC member and
Congressman John Elliot Rankin (D-MS) with a statement in a Denver interview that the threat
from spies in the U.S. was not great.156 Perturbed by Eisenhower’s apparent lack of Cold Warrior
motivation, Rankin reportedly responded that Eisenhower “could render a greater service by
throwing his strength behind these investigations and helping us to expose these vicious
individuals.”157 This conflict between Eisenhower and HUAC intensified as Columbia became a
primary target for anti-communist scrutiny.
Later that month, HUAC proposed to launch an investigation into ten colleges and named
Columbia as one of them. This proposal cast a suspicious light on Columbia especially as evident
from committee member Felix Edward Hebert’s (D-LA) comment, “It is interesting to note that
every time we talk about Communism we hear about Columbia University.”158 This negative
light cast on Columbia by HUAC, which reporters from the Columbia Spectator saw as the
Committee’s unfair “hostility towards leftist individuals,” drew Eisenhower into the line of
fire.159 Hearing of HUAC’s proposal, he both defended his institution and simultaneously
shielded himself from further scrutiny with a statement that he would resign immediately if he
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found out he was affiliated with “an institution that is contrary to democracy.”160 HUAC
threatened Eisenhower with a summons and inquisition into Columbia, though it never
happened. They never followed through with the summons although they did request, from
Eisenhower, a list of textbooks used at the University in June 1949.161 While this was happening,
however, Eisenhower joined the NEA’s Educational Policy Commission in officially
recommending that all communists be banned from teaching in schools. This action suggests that
maybe Eisenhower threw his weight behind the NEA’s anti-communist action in an attempt to
get out from under the scrutiny of HUAC.
Eisenhower in Defense of the Intellectual
Despite his own prejudices and the rigorous demands of the Cold War for loyalty in
education, Eisenhower also, at times, demonstrated a sincere reverence for intellect and often
came to the defense of his faculty and academic freedom against anti-communist interlopers.
While Eisenhower, in many speeches and private correspondences, may have expressed
sentiment that could be defined as suspicious or inimical towards intellectual endeavors, or the
intellectual class, he was by no means uninterested in intellectual activities. Eisenhower was
actually highly motivated and nursed a passion for knowledge just as most intellectuals do. As a
youth, for the most part, he did very well in school, excelling in geometry, English, and history
and developing a sincere passion for military history.162 He had a logical mind and a natural gift
for writing clearly and effectively. Interestingly, most of his fellow classmates in high school
predicted he would go on to become a professor of history at Yale.163 His academic talents were
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sharpened throughout his education at West Point military academy and in his career in the
military so much so that he became known as a “brain worker” in the army.164 Later on, in his
civilian career at Columbia, he indulged in many of his own academic interests, despite his selfimposed separation from the academic affairs of the university, and demonstrated a sincere
reverence for the intellectual atmosphere of this esteemed American institution of higher
learning.
In the previously discussed letter Eisenhower wrote to E.E. Hazlett while at Columbia, he
clarified that, contrary to popular opinion among his colleagues and friends, he was grateful for
his presidency and was fascinated with the intellectual opportunities available at such a
prestigious university as Columbia. Eisenhower’s interest in academia and intellectual endeavors
is further evidenced by his statement that “on a campus like Columbia’s, the greatest opportunity
is that of meeting constantly with fine minds in every kind of discipline.”165 He then elaborates
on this notion by expressing his love for engaging in discussions and debates on such subjects as
economics, history, contemporary civilization, natural and physical science, public health and
engineering. It is, thus, evident that Eisenhower displayed an admiration for intellectual
endeavors, in particular, those with practical applications such as economics, public health and
engineering.
When it came to anti-communist reprisals against his faculty and the preservation of
academic freedom at Columbia, Eisenhower generally did not succumb to red-baiting. As a
moderate and reasonable man, he did not believe in repressing free thought or bullying
intellectuals despite the prevailing reactionary trends in Cold War politics. Though loyalty was at
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the top of his agenda as an emerging Cold Warrior, he usually did not let anti-communism blind
his better judgement. Though he did agree with the NEA that communists should not have a role
in educating America’s youth, he did not engage in communist witch hunts at Columbia nor did
he advocate the use of invasive loyalty oaths. Also, unlike the anti-Semitic Nicholas Murray
Butler, Eisenhower did not attempt to alienate Jewish leftists in his faculty. When renowned
Columbia physicist I.I. Rabi, along with forty-nine other Columbia professors, protested the
University of California’s Board of Regents’ decision to terminate twenty-seven professors for
their refusal to sign loyalty oaths, Eisenhower stood behind their actions and went to great
lengths to keep Rabi secure in his Columbia professorship after the physicist was offered a
prominent position at Princeton.166 In his installation address, he spoke out against an
“intellectual iron curtain” at Columbia and declared that ignorance to the facts of communism,
fascism or any other statist ideology would only inhibit the growth of the democratic system. 167
Eisenhower openly avowed that the facts of communism would be taught at Columbia, which
demonstrated his devotion to the principles of academic freedom. It also demonstrated that
Eisenhower could use his position as a celebrated American hero to combat virulent anticommunism and political mudslinging in a way that lesser men could not because of the fear of
being unanimously labeled as un-American or subversive.168
In 1948, he defended a group of students who hosted a Marxist conference at Columbia’s
Pupin Hall with prominent leftist guest lecturers.169 After the conference, critics leveled
allegations of disloyalty and treachery against its orchestrators almost immediately. Two of the
most outspoken critics were the daughter of Michael Idvorsky Pupin, one of Columbia’s major
166
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benefactors, and her husband, Louis Smith.170 Mrs. Smith was outraged that communist Arnold
Johnson was allowed to give a speech to a Marxist study group at the building named after her
father. She threatened to have her father’s name removed from the building and had her husband
write a strongly worded letter directly to Eisenhower in protest. Mr. Smith asked Eisenhower in
his letter, “Will Columbia agree to keep traitors out of Pupin Hall?” He then went on to
denounce other recent speakers at Columbia and warned about the infiltration of “Kremlin agents
among our school and college teachers.”171 Eisenhower, despite this red-baiting by a major
donor, calmly replied to Smith that teaching proper democratic citizenship was his ultimate
priority at Columbia but he stood by the student’s rights to expose themselves to both sides of
the ideological coin so they could make their own minds up regarding the superiority of the
American way. He also expressed his “complete faith in the integrity and democratic purposes”
of Columbia’s faculty and administration.172 Eisenhower made it clear that anti-communism
would not cajole him into suppressing free speech and free thought at Columbia.
Another instance where Eisenhower’s reasonable sensibilities challenged anti-communist
hysteria at Columbia was when he came to the defense of a member of his faculty who was
under attack by the budding Senator Joseph McCarthy. On March 8, 1950, the Wisconsin
Senator accused Ambassador-at-Large and Hamilton Fish professor of international law and
diplomacy at Columbia, Philip C. Jessup, of harboring “an unusual affinity for Communist
causes.”173 This allegation was leveled one month after McCarthy’s infamous speech in
Wheeling, West Virginia, where he claimed to hold a list of 205 subversive communist
170
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sympathizers within the U.S. government. This event marked the beginning of his rise to
prominence in politics and the media. McCarthy was flying high at this time and crucifying
anyone he could, including Jessup.174 He summoned Jessup to testify before a Senate
subcommittee but Eisenhower, without prompt, immediately wrote a letter on behalf of Jessup’s
character to be entered into the committee record. Eisenhower wrote:
My dear Jessup, I am writing to tell you how much your University
deplores the association of your name with the current loyalty
investigation in the United States Senate. Your long and
distinguished record as a scholar…has won you the respect of your
colleagues and of the American people as well. No one who has
known you can for a moment question the depth or sincerity of
your devotion to the principle of Americanism.175
Eisenhower’s letter on behalf of Ambassador Jessup’s character handed the ambitious Senator
his first setback.176 The following year, Eisenhower came to Jessup’s defense again while Ike
was serving as NATO Commander proving his dedication to protecting the innocent from
unfounded allegations of communism.177 Eisenhower’s tussle with McCarthy demonstrated that
he would not flinch under anti-communist pressure to bully intellectuals into submission.
Furthermore, it revealed an antagonism between the General and the Senator over ideological
differences that would continue into Eisenhower’s U.S. presidency.178
Eisenhower Leaves Columbia
In late 1950, after only two years as president of Columbia, Eisenhower was called to
national duty once again by President Truman. This time he was tasked with the mission of
organizing NATO’s forces to stand in defense against the Soviet threat in the East. Reclaiming
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his title as Supreme Allied Commander, Eisenhower set out, once again, on another crusade to
protect the freedoms of the Western world. Though Eisenhower went off to serve his country
again in the international arena, many back at Columbia were left with a bad taste in their mouths
over his presidency. Officially, Eisenhower still retained presidential title but had no more direct
input in the Columbia administration. Instead, Grayson Kirk was installed as Acting President
and took over Eisenhower’s Columbia duties.179 While the Columbia trustees were not
necessarily pleased with this development, as Eisenhower could no longer serve as the face of
their institution anymore, they agreed to the new arrangement.
Many faculty members and outside observers, however, reflected negatively on
Eisenhower’s presence at Columbia. While most academics at Columbia saw Eisenhower’s
emphasis on general education for citizenship as anti-intellectual, many also took issue with his
military style leadership, his disconnect from university life, and his frequent absences from the
university in order to fulfill his obligations to President Truman and the Department of
Defense.180 Professors were also annoyed that Eisenhower, when he was present, was often
inaccessible as they had to go through his military chain of command in the form of his assistants
at Low Memorial Hall if they needed to confer with him. However, Ambrose asserts that the
faculty’s quarrel with Eisenhower’s inaccessibility was not altogether fair as most presidents of
large universities only ever confer with a small minority of professors. He argues, instead, that
the professors were more upset they were not able to obtain an audience with the national hero
rather than the university president.181
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The notion among faculty that Eisenhower was disconnected from university life was a
greater bone of contention that intensified after he briefly returned to the presidential residence at
60 Morningside Heights after leaving NATO in 1952. Once again, instead of using the residence
to serve university purposes, he used it to host Republican leaders, including hardline isolationist
William Jenner (R-IN), to discuss strategies for his campaign in the upcoming presidential
election. This personal use of university property for political gain incited sharp criticism from
faculty members, including historian Richard Hofstadter, and contributed to an ardent antiEisenhower movement on and off campus.182 Eisenhower’s behavior led many academics to
believe he did not want to be at Columbia as confirmed by noted Professor of English Lionel
Trilling who, “began to sense that he [Eisenhower] was nowhere in relation to the University and
this gradually began to affect people.”183
In a New Yorker article, journalist Richard Rovere discussed Eisenhower’s bid for the
U.S. presidency and offered a damning critique of the General’s Columbia administration.
Rovere laid into Eisenhower’s lack of qualifications in running a university, much less the
nation, stating: “Clearly Eisenhower has no qualifications worth discussing…. He is
unintellectual and probably anti-intellectual.” Similarly, a Life cover story article entitled “Mr.
President Eisenhower” suggested that Eisenhower’s Columbia presidency was a publicity stunt
to further his political interest in the White House.184 Richard Hofstadter was swept up in this
campaign against Eisenhower. Hofstadter signed a petition in protest of The New York Times
endorsement of Eisenhower and also drafted an advertisement in favor of Democratic candidate
Adlai Stevenson, a petition subsequently signed by over three hundred members of the Columbia
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faculty. Eisenhower’s eventual victory over Stevenson in the 1952 election stung Hofstadter who
saw the General’s win as a national backlash against American intellectualism as a whole: “hard
to resist the conclusion that Stevenson’s smashing defeat was . . . a repudiation by plebiscite of
American intellectuals and of intellect itself.”185 In an article Hofstadter later wrote in reaction to
Eisenhower’s win entitled “Anti-Intellectualism in Our Time,” he dismissed the General as a
“mental midget with a plebeian weakness for golf, football and Zane Grey novels.”186 Thus, the
legacy of Eisenhower at Columbia, especially in Hofstadter’s opinion, did not reflect the overall
positive image of him as a national leader that sent him to the White House.
Anti-Intellectualism in the Context of Ike’s Political Career
Eisenhower’s emphasis on citizenship and the American way at Columbia can be viewed
in terms of nation branding, or an attempt at subliminally broadcasting the superiority of the
American political system and culture.187 As a subscriber to the ideology of Americanism,
Eisenhower’s “simple man” outlook transferred well into the national agenda of Americanizing
education that began before the turn of the twentieth century and was coming into the
mainstream during the McCarthy era.188 His promotion of the exceptionalism of American
democracy through programs such as the CEP (that disseminated the message of Americanism to
thousands of students around the country) and the Adam Mickiewicz Chair (that attempted to
open up lines of American cultural penetration behind the Iron Curtain) revealed his desire to
amass soft power for the benefit of the United States. This notion that Eisenhower used the
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Columbia institution as a tool for broadcasting the exceptionalism of the American way of life
falls in line with his persona as an American hero, dutiful patriot, and crusader for the common
man. It also reveals a technique the general may have used to cast himself in a positive light
regarding his status as a budding politician in the national Cold War arena. However,
Eisenhower’s Americanist vision for Columbia had the adverse effect of marginalizing his
faculty and subordinating intellectual freedom to the pragmatic goal of broadcasting America’s
greatness. Scholars at Columbia including Provost Grayson Kirk, former Acting President Frank
Fackenthal, economist Eli Ginzberg, and historians Jacque Barzun and Richard Hofstadter all
saw Eisenhower’s Columbia experiment as a failure that set him apart from the academic
community, belittled the faculty’s role as intellectuals and mentors for new generations of
scholars, and reduced the prestige of the university as a preeminent center for the life of the
mind.
This analysis of the General’s take on education as Columbia University President sets
the stage for his later actions as President of the United States. A comparison with Hofstadter’s
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life reveals how Eisenhower’s agenda at Columbia, and later as
president-elect and U.S. president, fell in line with a long history of anti-intellectualism that
came to pervade American politics since at least the Jacksonian era.189 At Columbia, Eisenhower
developed and honed his Cold Warrior persona based on populism, patriotism and a pragmatic
world view. His networking as Columbia President through his patriotic citizenship agenda
played into his defeat of Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) for the Republican nomination in 1952.190
Similarly, his association with the common man and his patriotic sensibilities as a soldier,
general and crusader for American freedom granted him a publicity advantage against Adlai
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Stevenson in the presidential election of 1952. Eisenhower’s humble beginnings, modest
demeanor, and outstanding military record elevated him to the status of beloved national hero.
Conversely, Stevenson was marginalized by his elite education, pretentious persona, and
association with prominent leftist intellectuals such as Arthur Schlesinger and Archibald
MacLeish.191
Later on, as President of the United States, Eisenhower’s domestic and international Cold
War agenda mirrored some of his actions as president of Columbia. Domestically, Eisenhower’s
opinion that education should be utilized to create effective citizens for the betterment of the
United States as a whole in order to bolster state security in the wake of Cold War threats came
to fruition with his approval of the National Defense of Education Act (NDEA). The NDEA,
which would provide federal funding for schools and mandated the use of loyalty oaths,
established a pragmatic nationwide educational agenda based on creating more experts in the
realms of math and science in order to one-up the Soviet Union in the technology and space
race.192 The loyalty oath requirement of the NDEA was specifically criticized by Hofstadter in a
statement he wrote to Columbia Student Council member Edward Elkind: “Such a requirement
suggests that those who think and study are necessarily dangerous. It is thus an implicit
endorsement of the very anti-intellectualism that all our educational efforts are meant to
overcome.”193 Internationally, Eisenhower’s work with the United States Information Agency
(USIA) established a national line of “cultural penetration” into Europe and other areas of the
world in order to amass soft power for the U.S. in a bid for ideological and cultural supremacy
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with the Soviet Union.194 The USIA was one of many manifestations of the Eisenhower
administration’s obsession with psychological warfare.195 It reflected Eisenhower’s notion that
knowledge should be utilized as a powerful weapon for the state.
Conclusion
The politics of loyalty and anti-intellectualism were influential forces in Eisenhower’s
career at Columbia University. Eisenhower developed this anti-intellectual habit throughout his
life and it came to a head at Columbia where he was surrounded by faculty intellectuals on a
regular basis. As a youth in Abilene, Eisenhower learned the values of hard work, determination
and pragmatism, which led him to become a very successful, forthright man. However, his small
town upbringing and “simple man” philosophy also inculcated in him a sense that intellectual
contemplation and introspection were superfluous luxuries that he had little time for (as they
would not help him achieve his life goals). At West Point, Eisenhower learned to become an
officer and the leader he was destined to be as he developed his sense of duty and observed what
incredible accomplishments could be achieved through cooperation with his fellow men. While
his West Point educational development prepared Eisenhower to thrive as a military leader, it
also made him susceptible to military preconceptions about free individual thought and
intellectual inquiry.196 Eisenhower’s military career and experience as Commander of the
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in World War II elevated him to
the status of a national hero. Inadvertently, it also caused him to develop a sense of alarmism
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regarding external threats to American freedom and democracy.197 This alarmism is evident in
much of Eisenhower’s Post-WWII discourse and influenced his later status as a Cold Warrior. It
promoted, in him, suspicion of intellectuals and the life of the mind.
As Columbia’s president, Eisenhower’s anti-intellectualism, as the cumulative effect of
his cultivated sense of national duty, rural “simple man” belief in the values of cooperation and
pragmatism, alarmism over external threats to the American way of life, and pressure to conform
to the discourse of the Cold War influenced him to establish an administration that prioritized
citizenship, progress and loyalty above all else. From his first days there at the university,
Eisenhower’s collective discourse reflected an anti-intellectual habit. It framed education simply
as a tool for making more loyal and effective citizens, contributing to the progress of the
American community. This discourse came to fruition in some of Eisenhower’s actions at
Columbia, namely establishing the Citizenship Education Project. The CEP was a nation
branding project aimed at teaching young people patriotism and the paramount importance of
citizenship duty within a democracy rather than fostering in students a sense of the intrinsic
value of academia. Similarly, the American Assembly was a program constructed for the purpose
of helping to build a stronger American economic infrastructure in order to establish a bulwark
against foreign ideologies as opposed to helping train a new generation of scholars.
Eisenhower’s fixation on loyalty politics and anti-communist distrust of leftist
intellectuals also caused tension between him and the faculty. Though he was no McCarthyite,
the notion of loyalty in education highlighted his alarmist nature especially in response to
encroaching foreign “isms.” It consistently influenced his discourse and administrative actions as
president of Columbia. His position on loyalty at Columbia was not inimitable but rather
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coincided with a greater national trend of loyalty politics established already through President
Truman’s Loyalty Security Program. His anti-intellectual prejudice was evident in many of his
interactions with his faculty and staff, which often boiled down to Eisenhower’s judgement of
people based on their moral character and sensibilities rather than their intellectual capabilities.
Though Eisenhower did exhibit an anti-intellectual prejudice as Columbia president,
evidence suggests that he was pressured to adopt an anti-intellectual approach to education by
influential parties in American Cold War society. Eisenhower might have personally harbored
some distrust and disdain for the life of the mind and those who practice it. But he was also an
intelligent, interested and moderate man and not necessarily inclined to attack or scorn
intellectualism at Columbia, one of America’s finest institutions of higher learning. He generally
spoke up for academic freedom and made it clear there would be no “intellectual iron curtain at
Columbia.”198 The idea of the Cold War imposing anti-intellectualism on Eisenhower’s
Columbia administration is most notable in the public pressure on the Columbia University
institution to prove its loyalty to the nation. The controversy over the Adam Mickiewicz Chair of
Polish Studies and HUAC’s intended investigation of Columbia prompted Eisenhower to act in
accordance with current anti-communist trends in education if only to keep Columbia reputable.
In the context of Eisenhower’s Columbia presidency, Richard Hofstadter’s assessment of
the General as an anti-intellectual is slightly punitive. At Columbia, Eisenhower did harbor some
form of prejudice towards the life of the mind based on his humble upbringing and life in the
military. He also strategically utilized a populist, patriotic educational agenda, which often
tended to marginalize or alienate his faculty, to perpetuate the philosophy of Americanism and
appeal to powerful Cold War forces in American life. These ways of thinking and operating
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translated into Eisenhower’s U.S. presidency and were notable in his Cold War information and
education programs such as the USIA and the NDEA. However, the context of his Columbia
presidency suggest he was largely framed as an anti-intellectual by university scholars who saw
him as continuing the oppressive legacy of President Butler or succumbing to the prejudice of
anti-communist government organizations against the Columbia institution. This generally was
not the case as Eisenhower stood up for free thought, did not advocate the requirement of loyalty
oaths, never threw around slanderous accusations of disloyalty, and defended his faculty from
McCarthyite reprisals.
Eisenhower did not harbor a fervent disdain for intellectuals or adhere to reactionary
politics, which Hofstadter never acknowledged. The General’s disposition was in contrast to
many of his contemporaries who pursued the tactics of McCarthyism, which was at the core of
his appeal as a politician.199 Today, as in the early days of the Cold War, such moderate sociopolitical viewpoints are becoming scarce as the crusade against the life of the mind has returned
in full force. With a new U.S. President who condemns the left as being full of subversive, unAmerican propagators of fake news and a Secretary of Education who openly supports antiintellectual notions such as Creationism, the days of reasonable sensibilities prevailing in politics
and education have apparently lapsed. The years to come will undoubtedly thrust the American
university into the crosshairs of anti-intellectualism once again, but this time without the
balancing act provided by moderate American leaders such as General Eisenhower.
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